CONSTITUTIONAL IXTERPRETATION.

duction from these opinions-a new canon of constitutional
law, viz.: that a statute interfering with "natural rights"
must be shown to be authorized, not that it must be shown
to beprohibited.
Philadelphia,'November 30, 1892.

CAN PRICES BE REGULATED BY LAW?
AN EXAMINATION OF MR. ARTHUR T. HADLEY'S ARTICLE,
"LEGAL THEORIES OF PRICE REGULATION."
By WM. DRAPER LEwis, PH.D.

MR. ARTHUR T. HADLEY, in the first number of the
Yale Review, has an exceedingly able and very entertaining
article on "Legal Theories of Price Regulation?" The
article is historical in form. Commencing with the Roman
law, he points out how nowhere has the doctrine that a
man is absolute master of his own property, in respect to the
price at which" he will sell it, or the charge for its use, been
carried out so consistently as at Rome. On this point he
says: "'Such a state of things was only possible where law
was highly developed and commercial transactions but
slightly so. In ancient Rome both of these conditions existed in a marked degree. The Romans were able to command the products of the world by the compulsory labor
of slaves at home, and taxation of people who were little
better than slaves abroad. The rich did not need to sell;
the poor did not need to buy. Under these circumstances
price was a matter of trifling importance compared with
that fixity of tenure on which the Roman organization
rested." Then the writer shows how in medixval Europe
farmers, being obliged to trade with artisans, an exchange
was no longer an isolated transaction, but "part of the
work of supplying a market in which all producers, to a
greater or less degree, were interested."
Consequently
I

Yale Review, Vol. 1, p. 56 ('May, 1892).
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there grew up a system of regulation of price by guilds;
7hich, being abused, led the courts to resort to the common
law system of the regulation of prices by enforced free competition. Thus we are told, that "The Roman, law
-allowed free- determination of prices as a -consequence of
the unrestricted right of private property. The common
law encouraged it as a means of supplying a market more
fully and fairly than could be done in any other way. The.
common law, both in its rule and exceptions, recognized
the public commercial end, which the Roman law didnot."
Besides enforcing free competition through the coifrts
•by rules against restraint of trade, in the positive acts of
legislation, such as laws against trusts, etc., free competition has been and still is attempted to be enforced on the
,common law theory that the price of a commodity is a
public matter.
,
I
Mr. HADLIEY then points out how, in-many instances,
enforced competition evidently will not -work. There are
some industries in which at the -prsent time competition is
practically impossible. The next step in the development
-of price regulation .was, therefore, the attempt to limit
prices in such industries by "charter maxima." This
.again, it is pointed out, allowed great inequalities. Within
the charter maxima, as in the case of a railroad, unequal
Tates could be charged different shippers.
"

-In

this dilemma our author tells us that -the, State

governments in the United States took another step. The
legislatures established -rates or "prices" to be charged'by.
railroads. The constitutionality of these acts came before
the Supreme Court in the Granger Cases.2 The railroads
resisted on the ground of unlimited property rights. The
Court upheld the constitutionality of the law. Mr. HADLEr's comment on this decision is as follows: t"It was one
-of those practical makeshifts which, like the jury system,
prevent our laws from being too good for the people who
live under them. As against the position of the corpora294 U. S., 113-187 (1876).
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tions, however, the grounds of the decision were a little
stronger than they seemed. The claim of the right of a
railroad to make rates just as any other business man was
not one which could have, been sustained in precedent."
The claim of the railroad was a claim that government had
no right to interfere and regulate the price for the sale of
property. Mr. HADLEY seems to consider that this claim
is just, but, owing to the exceptional kind of property, i. e.,
being devoted to public use, thinks it could be regulated
by the State. This was certainly the way in which the'
majority of the Court handled the Granger Cases. But Mr.
HADLEY himself has just taken pains to show us the fallacy
underlying his own and the Court's narrow reasons for
their opinion that a legislature of a State can regulate the
rates of fare charged by a railroad company. The Supreme
Court of the United States in the Granger Cases, in the case
of Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota,' and in the later
case of Budd v. New York, ' seems to start out with the assumption that the price of any commodity or service is not a
public matter, and, therefore, that price cannot be regulated
by the legislature of the State, except where the thing sold is
a "public service." This point of view is one which entirely
ignores the fact, which Mr. HADLEY himself has just pointed
out, that the common law rules against combinations in
restraint of trade are based on the assumption that the
public as a whole has an interest in price; not only in the
price of railway tickets, but in the price of everything sold
in the markets of the nation. If the price of wheat cannot
be regulated on the ground of property, why are not laws
against corners in wheat void on the ground that they interfere with the sacred rights of private property? Against
the main proposition of the railway companies in the
Granger cases, the possible ground for the- decision was
indeed stronger than it seemed. It is the same as the
broad ground of the common law when it strikes at com1 U. S., 276 (1889).,
134
143 t. S., 517 (i891 Term). See article by Mr. McMurtrie, supra, p. I.
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binations to raise prices and brands them as illegal-the
-ground that price is a public matter, and regulations of
price which the people desire the people can enforce. This
ground, so plainly stated by Mr. HADLEY, so plainly recognized by the courts in upholding laws against trust combi*nations, would be clearly seen by both if it was not for the
confused and confusing "police'power" which, on the onehind, as in Mulger v. Kansas,' enables a State to annul the
safeguards of the Constitution against the taking of private
property; and on the other, as in the Granger cases, tends.
.to limit all State activities to so-called "police laws."' Indeed, the words seem to have a magic in them, whichi
mystifies the reasoning powers of the courts and bar, till
rising from the study of reported constitutional cases, one
sighs for the coming of another MARSHALL to sweep, by
his clear-cut analysis, the mists of confusion away.,
The circumstances of industry render etforced competition useless in the case of a railroad, or oblige people
to use a railroad if they want to travel. These facts justify
legislative determination of the prices of transportation.
Why then, if in the judgment of legislatures enforced competition is always useless, should they not regulate all prices?
If the inability of enforced competition to produce results
is the ground of legislative interference in the one case,
why should it not-be sufficient in all cases ? And if a legal
magazine may give an economic forecast or give economic
predictions we should say that the present development of
industry would lead to; the legal regulation of the price of
many commodities, in which we are now trying the experiment-rapidly proving a failure-of anti-trust and combination
laws.
MR.
HADLEY,

I

I

after this qu'asi approval of the Court's
position in the Granger Cases, that railroads have not an
1 123 U. S., 623 (1887).
2 1 do not wish to be understood as approving those expressions of

the majority in the Granger Cases, which tend to limit the safeguards
against taking private property without compensation to an actual transference of title. See infra.
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-unlimited right to fix what rates they please "just like any
other business," concludes by defending the Court's position
in the now great case of Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minne-

sota1.

The spirited dissent of the late Mr. Justice

BRAD-

LEY, he regards as "strange," and of that part of the
-eport of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 189o
-which says that the making of rates is an administrative
and not a judicial function, and that the legislature has
unlimited powers to fix what rates it pleases, we read
"that it shows the looseness of reasoning to which the
pedple have been accustomed in modem times."
And yet
we are compelled to observe that Mr. HADLEY has mistaken
the position of the Court in the Minnesota Railroad Case,
just as the dissenting judges and the Interstate Commerce
Commission mistook it.' This mistake on the part of Mr.
HADLEY

may be due to the fact that individual judges,

composing a minority of the majority, may have intimated
to him that the legislature had not the power to fix what
rates they pleased. From a remark of the late Mr. Justice
BRADLEY, which came to the notice of the writer, it would
seem to be beyond dispute that the dissenting opinion in the
case was written against the expression of opinion in the.
consultation room by individual members of the majority,
rather than against the written opinion of the Court, and
that the learned Justice's mind was turned, by his astonishment at what he understood as the 'position of the majority,
away from a consideration of the real merits of the case.
As was pointed out in a review of the life of the late
Justice, which appeared, shortly after his death, in THE
AMERICAN LAW R-EGISTER AND REVIEW,3 a power to do
what another considers reasonable is no power at all. If
the power of the legislatures of the States or the State
Railroad Commissioners to fix .rates, is a power limited to
what Judges consider reasonable, we may have, as Mr.
HADLEY says:
"A most important counterpoise to the
1X34 U. S., 418 (1889).
'Of MR. HADLEy'S paper it may be fairer to say that he has failed
to point out any ground for the decision of the Court.
3 AER. LAw R G. AND REV., p. 278, April, 1892.
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evils of unrestricted democracy," but We accomplish this
'result by abandoning democracy and substituting a judicial
\, oligarchy.
. But let us turn from what Mr. HADLEY
thinks the
-Court decided to what they actually did decide. The Act.
of Minnesota, passed March 7, 1887, established- a Railroad
and Warehouse Commission.' The commissioners were
given the power, if they considered the rates fixeV by the railroads unreasonable, .to compel any carrier to change the
same, and to adopt such charge as the cQmmission "shall declare to be equal and reasonable." The Courts of the
State were directed to issue writs of maidamnus to enforce
the orders of the commission. The commission fixed certain rates for, reight to be charged by the Chicago, etc.,
Railroad Company, and the company refusing to put such
rates into operation, the commission applied to the courts,'
•for a writ of mahdamnus. The Court granted the writ, and
refused the application on the part of the railroad company
to prove that the rates fixed 'deprived-them of their pr6perty, in contravention 'of the Fourteenth Amendment. On.
appeal, the opinion of Mr. ,Justice BLATcrvoRD points out

that the State has a right to fix the rates of fare. Then
t1fe learned Justice, in discussing the question raised.by the
railroad's being deprived of the right to question the rates
fixed by the commission before the Court, says: "-The
question of fhe reasonableness of a rate charged for transportation by 'railroad company, involving as it does the
element of reasonableness, both as regards the coxpany
and as regards the public,- is eminently a question of judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its deterHad the learned Justice stopped there, there
rmination. '"'
would be much to be said in favor of Mr. HADLEY'S interpre-

tation of the meaning of tie decision, i.e., that it means that
reasonabl.eness was a question for the Court, and we must
infer that the Court should go into, in determining the .' reasonableness," all the economic and social questions involved. Indeed, it would only be the absurdity of the posi.Gen. Laws, 1887, C. 10.
p. 458.

2 Op.,
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tion apparently assumed that would lead us to doubt this interpretation of the meaning of the decision. But the opinion
does not stop there. Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD goes on to"
say: "If the company is deprived of the power of charging
reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such an
investigation takes place in the absence of an investigation
by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its
property, and thus, in substance and effect, of the firqerty
itsel/." We begin to see what the word reasonable, as used
by the Court, means. It does not mean economically reasonable or politically expedient, it does not point to some
undefined standard of justice residing in the judicial conscience, but to the question: Has the legislature, in establishing the rate, taken private property? The opinion that
this is the position assumed by the majority is strengthened
by the short opinion of the late Mr. Justice MILLER, where.
he says: "Neither the legislature, nor the commission
acting under the authority of the legislature, can establish
arbitrarily and without regard to justice and right a tariff
of rates for such transportation, which is so unreasonable
as to practically destroy' the value of firolerty of persons

engaged in the carrying business." 1
We may be mistaken in our interpretation of the opinion
Then he adds that neither has the legislature power to
fix such exorbitant rates as to interfere with the public right of the use
of such transportation.
This last proposition, while intensely interesting, need not be discussed here. We can point out, however, that the direct conclusion from
the position assumed is that, if a legislature cannot fix a rate unreasonably high, neither can an individual owner of a railroad, and, therefore,
without any statute on the subject a shipper can obtain relief from unreasonably high charges in the courts. Did not the late learned Justice forget that the interests of the people as a whole are represented by the
legislature of the State? That the courts must presume that the rates
fixed by the legislature are the most expedient rates from the standpoint
of the people taken as a whole? The only business of the courts is to
see that private property has not been taken for public purposes without
just compensation. A man's right to ride on a railroad of the State is not
one of his private rights which the legislature cannot take away without
paying him. True, the legislature must not make different rates for different men, i.e., deny them the equal protection of the law. But is it not
paradoxical to say that a legislature cannot take public property for public use without compensating the public?
1

Op., p. 459.
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of the Court, but we cannot believe that the Court mean,
and will so decide when the question comes properly before
them, that the power of the legislature to fix prices at
least for what is called "public business" is not practically
unlimited; but we think they must mean that where
private property is taken compensation must be made. If
Mr. HADLEY'S interpretation is correct, the decision richly
merited the language of the dissent of the great constitutional lawyer. But if the interpretation given is the proper
one, all lovers of individual liberty, of law and justice can
pr9perly rejoice. It is a most moinentous decision. It
means that the old and vicious doctrine of Mulger v.
Kansas,' of Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,2 has been
abandoned, and that the dissent of Mr. Justice FIELD in
the former case, in so far as he considers that property
may be taken .if .one is deprived of the use, even though
the title may remain in him, represents the present opinion
of the Court. Those cases decided that a "'taking" of \
private property must be a physical taking in order to
render the State'liable for conipensation: that a man who
has put up a beer factory under permission of the legisla-" treof the State, without. being deprived of his property, can
be deprived of the right to manufacture beer, though his
machinery be useless for anything else-'an unfairness too
palpable to stand the test of time.
The confusion which arises in discussing these cases;
as in discussing the case of Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Minnesota,, springs from the apparent inability of many people to
separate the two questions involved in each. The first s:
Has the legislature power to fix prices or prohibit certain
uses being made of property? The second, and entirely distinct question, is whether the prices fixed, or the prohibition result in taking private property within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring just compensation
to be made. Now, the position of the Supreme Court and
the other Courts of America on the first question heretofore
1
2

123 U. S., 623 (1887).
97 U. S., 6sg (1887) ; see also Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S., 25 (1878).

CAN PRICES BE REGULATED BY LAW?

has been that the legislature has no power to fix the prices
of commodities, or to say to the citizens you must not mantfacture this or that, no matter how expedient they might
consider such a course to be, unless the public have aheculiar interest in the business, or the morals or health of the
community is at stake. This position we believe to be open
to criticism on the ground that the common law is right
when it declares that the price of any commodity taken as
a whole, or the success of any single industry taken as a
whole, is a public matter, and therefore combinations in
restraint of trade, etc., are, if harmful, unlawful.
On the other hand, up to the opinion in the case of
Chicago, etc., Railway Co. v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court
and other American courts had held that where prices
could be regulated at all, or where a business could be prohibited at all, such prohibitory laws or regulation of prices
could never be construed into taking of property, however
useless they might tender the specific kinds of property
affected. Such an interpretation, which rendered constitutional provisions regarding compensation for private property words with a very limited' practical meaning, we are
glad to believe will, in the immediate future, be definitely
abandoned. That is what we read from -the decision of
the Court commented on by Mr. HADLEY. At the same
time we believe that Mr. HADLEY, or any one else, cannot
seriously maintain that courts should pass on the expediency of a law regulating prices in the light of abstract
justice and sound economic policy. Certainly such an
opinion cannot be the sober judgment of the great lawyers
who formed the majority of the Court on that occasion.'
'There is an interesting question growing out of the above.

Public

moneys inust be expended for a public purpose. This may be conceded.
Suppose the legislature of a State should compel all who choose to sell
wheat to sell it at one-half the cost and compensate them for their loss,
would this be spending money for a public purpose? See* a partial
answer to this question in an article by the writer in 31 AMERicAN LAw
REGISTER AND REVinW, p. 301 (May, 1892), entitled, "Is the Bounty on
Sugar Constitutional ?" in reply to an article on the same subject by
CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE, Esp., on the "Sugar Bounties," in

HarvardLazw Review, Vol. V, p. 320.

